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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
RORTY, NEOPRAGMATISM AND NON-FOUNDATIONAL INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS
by
Harry D. Gould
Florida International University
Miami, Florida
Professor Nicholas G. Onuf, Major Professor
The purpose of this paper is to apply the work of 
Richard Rorty to questions of ethics in International
Relations.
Beginning- with discussion of Pragmatism in this chapter, 
and Rorty's political beliefs in the second, the paper moves 
in Chapter Three to the means by which Rorty has come to hold 
his ethical beliefs. This takes the reader through
discussions of the contingency of language, self and
community to the notions of irony and liberal ironism.
Chapter Four contrasts the (neo)Pragmatist conception of 
progressive, piecemeal social change to traditions which 
eschew such a notion in favor of immanent critique.
ussion in chapter five moves to the application of this 
neopragniafist line of thought to the discussion of solidarity
i i i
and human rights, bringing all of the various strands of this 
paper together. In the conclusion, two apparent 
inconsistencies in Rorty's clarified.
iv
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Chapter I
Introduction
i
The purpose of this thesis is to apply the work of 
Richard Rorty to questions of ethics in International 
Relations. Beginning with discussion of Pragmatism in this 
chapter and Rorty's political beliefs in the second, the 
thesis moves in Chapter Three to the means by which Rorty has 
come to hold his ethical beliefs, which in the tradition of 
American Pragmatism are inseparable from his political 
beliefs. This takes the reader through discussions of the 
contingency of language, self and community to the notions of 
irony and liberal ironism, closing the circle started with 
the- introduction of Rorty's political credo. Chapter Four 
contrasts the (neo)Pragmatist conception of progressive, 
piecemeal social change to traditions which eschew such a 
notion in favor of immanent critique. Discussion in the 
fifth chapter moves to the application of this neo-pragmatist 
line of thought to the disc n of human rights, bringing
all of the various strands of this paper together. The final 
chapter addresses various challenges to the neopragmatist 
position as articulated here.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism Is the truly American philosophy. Associated 
with such names as John Dewey, William James and C.S. Peirce, 
its heyday was the very end of the nineteenth century and the 
first half of the twentieth. In the mid twentieth century,
ito disfavor as logical positivism, empiricism and
their derivatives gained ascendance. Two quotations are most 
often associated with pragmatism, and better than any others
summarize its ethos.
William James-, expressing the role of interest in truth, 
stated, "The true is the name of Whatever proves itself to be 
good in the way of be ' - f, and good, too for definite 
assignable reasons." Truth is thus a compliment we pay to a
statement which furthers our interests.
Dewey elaborated this point, obliterating the is/ought
distinction along the way.
We only acquire whatever knowledge we 
have now because we had certain purposes, 
and the point of that knowledge is, for 
us, inseparable from our future purposes.
All reason is practical reason... To 
characterize something as good is to say 
that it will provide us with satisfaction 
in our purposes.
A useful metaphor, provided by Rorty himself, to 
illustrate the self image of pragmatist philosophy is that of 
clearing the (mostly philosophical) underbrush leaving it to 
others to plant the forest. The others for pragmatism are 
social workers, activists, journalists, politicians and
educators.1
As Rorty interprets Dewey, pragmatism is a way of making 
political liberalism, attractive to those with philosophical
1 Richard Rorty, "The Banality of Pragmatism arid the Poetry of Justice" 
in Brint and Weaver, eds. Pragmatism, in Law.and. Soc i ety. p. 92.
Richard Rorty, "Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical 
Presuppositions?" Academe. 80/6 p. 58.
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ta provides a rationale for nonideological,
compromising, reformist, muddling through." Pragmatists value 
parliamentary democracy and the welfare state, but not 
because they are demonstrated through philosophical 
argumentation to be superior; It is on the basis of 
"invidious comparison" with other forms of social 
organization that it is held to be best.2
The upshot of these beliefs is that culture does not 
need abstract, philosophical principles to be legitimate. A 
society is "just" if its laws are in accord with the shared 
self understandings of its members. Foundationalists will 
reject this as relativism, arguing that morality must be 
based on something more than prevailing social conventions, 
but as will be shown later, this is a charge Rorty di sir ' ,3
Pragmatists do not (as will be discussed at length in 
Chapter three) believe that there is an intrinsic human 
nature, therefore it is not on the basis of the fidelity of 
the democratic form of governance to intrinsic human needs 
that it can be defended. A pragmatist utopia is one in which 
"everybody has had a chance to suggest ways in which we might 
cobble together a... society, and in which all suggestions have
2 Richard Rorty, "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation: A Response to
Jean-Francois Lyotard" in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth:. Philosophical
Papers volume 1. ■ de . . * r sity Press. 1991. p. 211.
3 a l n . ’mis, "Philosophy as a Kind of Narrative." . 1 L 1 7,
Fall 1989. p. 151.
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been thrashed out in free and open encounters."4 5 *
Stanley Fish, a contemporary figure in pragmatism (what
will be called neopragrnatism once the differences are
illustrated) articulates the pragmatic ideal as the belief
that if people would only stop trying to come up with a
standard of absolute right which could then be used to
denigrate the beliefs and efforts of other people (for
example, ALL Western religions, Platonism, Kantianism, and
Marxism), they might spend more time sympathetically engaging
with the beliefs of others and learning to appreciate them.5
If we conceive of ourselves as 
creatures clinging together in a 
foundationless world, rather than as 
philosophers in search of foundations, we 
might cease to experience life as a 
fight.6
The central message to be gleaned from the above is that 
the critique of absolutes is not really very threatening. We 
can, in fact, function without absolutes; we always have.
I shall take now the opportunity to explore the
pragmatist notion of truth adumbrated above, because it is 
central to the Pragmatic project, and no less to Rorty's 
version of it. "Truth" for pragmatists is not something 
worthy of extensive philosphical investigation. It is just
4 "Cosmopolitanism without Emancipation", p. 213.
5 Stanley Fish, "Almost Pragmatism" in Brint and Weaver, p. 64.
b "Almost Pragmatism", p. 66.
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the name of a "property which all true statements share." 
Pragmatists believe that there is not much of interest to be 
said about this common property. Some acts under some 
circumstances are good, but there is nothing universal or 
useful to be said about what makes them good.7
Pragmatists want to get beyond discussing the nature of 
Truth or Goodness, because they feel such topics have 
outlived their usefulness. They are not articulating 
theories saying that there are no such things as Truth or the 
Good, merely that the search for such theories will get us
nowhere.8
Neopragmatism, conceives of itself as different from the 
original pragmatism in the following ways. Neopragmatism 
tends to focus upon language rather than experience, mind, or 
consciousness. This comes from the influence of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson on Rorty. Also having been 
influenced by Thomas Kuhn, the neopragrnatist Rorty is 
suspicious of the scientific method. The original 
pragmatists believed that there were no social problems that 
could not. be solved by the application of sound scientific 
technique; Rorty is not so sure.9
7 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy" in Consequences of 
Pragmatism. University of Minnesota Press. 1982. p. xiii.
8 "Pragmatism and Philosophy", p. xiv.
9 "Banality.,,", p. 91.
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Rorty's relationship to Philosophy is rather complex. 
Despite being a philosopher by trade, he considers himself an 
anti-Philosopher. The root of his objection to philosophy is 
essentially that it regards itself as Philosophy.
Rorty's first cannonade was found in his groundbreaking 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. This work is held by 
many to be his most important and substantial; it is an 
assault on the very self-image of Philosophy as a fach, For
the purposes of this work, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature is of secondary importance. The revolutionary claims 
made in it have now been internalized by Rorty, and are 
largely implicit in his writing -- there is no trace of the 
correspondence theory of truth, the "idea" idea, or an 
idealized language left in Rorty's work.
Ever since Hobbes and Locke, philosophy has been guided 
by the belief that its role is to search for Truth, or the 
foundations of knowledge. This seif-conception was 
reinforced by Descartes, Kant and Hegel, and can actually be
traced back to Plato. The belief common to all of these
thinkers was that through human rationality, and later 
science, the foundations of knowledge could be identified.10
Rorty focuses particularly on the period since
10 Richard Rorty, Philosophy,and.the Mirror of Nature. Princeton 
Jniversity Press. 1977. passim.
Robert Heineman, Authority and the Liberal Tradition. Transaction 
Publishers. 1994.
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Descartes. It was during this period that the dominant 
metaphor of the mind as a "mirror of nature" took hold. 
Philosophy took it as its job to polish the mirror and, more 
importantly, focus the images reflected in the mirror.11
The metaphor was vague enough for some ostensibly 
crucial differences of view. For example, empiricists and 
idealists could still disagree over how to interpret the 
metaphor: is the mind a passive recipient of a given 
objective reality out there, or does it play a role in 
shaping that reality? For Rorty these differences are minor 
compared with the single overriding prejudice that unites 
them. There are three parts to this, which I take from 
Christopher Norris' discussion of Forty's Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature. Philosophy, according to this tradition, 
is best engaged in a quest for its own rational or logical 
foundations. These foundations will reveal themselves only 
to a mind specially trained in "the business of lucid self- 
knowledge. Philosophy will thus become a "science" primus 
inter pares, because it promised an ultimate grounding for 
all other modes of thought.12
Rorty wants to get beyond the conception of Philosophy 
as the final arbiter to all claims to knowledge. He follows 
the three philosophers he takes to be the most important of
Philosophy as a Kind of Writing", p..
the twentieth century, Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, in 
rejecting the possibility of systematic Philosophy which can 
provide a final explanation of the world. He considers them 
and himself edifying philosophers, philosophers whose aim is 
no more grandiose than helping people make their lives
better.
.9
Chapter II
Rorty's Politics 
A First Glance
10
Rorty's Political Credo
Rorty most plainly stated his political be]els in his 
response to Richard Bernstein's attack on the implications of 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Rorty was in the curious 
position of having been damned both by conservatives for 
being postmodern, relativist and irrationalist, and by 
postmodernists and left for being neoconservative. Rorty 
acknowledged expecting the criticisms from conservatives, 
regarding such criticism as proof of being on the right 
track; the other criticisms were more surprising to him.
Several of the items enumerated in his credo are no
longer relevant because of their focus on the cold war. I
will quote Rorty at length here.
(1) Given the failures of central 
governmental planning, we can no longer 
make "nationalization of the means of 
production" a central element in our 
definition of "socialism"... we have to use 
some such definition of "socialism" as 
Habermas's: 'overcoming the rise to 
dominance of cognitive instrumental 
[interests]. (Alternatively, perhaps:
"overcoming the greed and selfishness 
which are still built into the
motivational patterns impressed on our 
children, and into the institutions 
within which they will have to live."}
We have to find a definition that commits 
us to both greater equality and a change 
in moral climate without committing us to- 
any particular economic setup. Nobody so 
far has invented an economic setup that 
satisfactorily balances decency and 
efficiency... There is nothing sacred about 
either the free market or about central 
planning; the proper balance between the 
two is a matter of experimental 
tinkering.
11
(3) Within the First World, the social 
democratic scenario of steady reform 
along increasingly egalitarian lines.,, has 
been stalled for decades, largely because 
the political right... (made up of the 
people who have no interest in increasing 
equality) has diverted public attention, 
money and energy...
(6) ...social democrats have to maneuver 
on (at least) two fronts - against 
enemies at home in the interest of, for 
example, the people in the urban ghettos 
and rural slums of the First and Third 
Worlds...
(7) ...no single set of slogans is going 
to help. There is no way to consolidate 
our enemies in any interesting
"theoretical" way.
(8) We have freedom of the press, an 
independent judiciary, and universities 
in which teachers continually urge 
students to combat... 'the forces and 
tendencies at work (eg., class conflict, 
social division, patriarchy, racism) 
which are compatible with liberal 
political practices but nevertheless 
foster real inequality and lim.it 
effective political freedom.' Such 
fragile, flawed, institutions, the 
creation of the last 300 years, are 
humanity's most precious achievements.
It is quite possible that all such 
institutions may vanish by the year 2100.
There will then... be nothing to prevent 
the future being, as Orwell said, 'a boot 
stamping down on a human face, forever.'
Nothing is more important than the 
preservation of these liberal
i n s t i t u t i o n s .13
One may summarize Forty's politics, as Joan Williams has
13 Richard Rorty, "Thugs and Theorist 
565-567.
[Political Theory 15/4 19 gg PP.
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done, as being egalitarian, feminist, and social democratic.14 15
He admits to sharing the politics of Hubert Humphrey.is
Having given this general sketch of Rorty's politics, we 
will proceed in the next chapter to look more closely at 
Rorty's vision of the liberal utopia. From there, we will 
work through the way in which he arrives at the conclusions 
which shape his vision, and some of the implications of a 
liberal-ironic utopia.
As will become even more evident in the next chapter, 
there is a prima facie tension between the J.S. Mill/Isaiah 
Berlin style negative liberty Rorty advocates on the one 
hand, and his quasi-Marxist egalitarianism adumbrated in his 
credo. The first concern focuses on protecting equality of 
opportunity, and then leaving everyone alone; the second, by 
Rorty's own admission, must necessarily involve the active 
equalizing of extant economic circumstances; i .eleveling.
I do not relieve, however, that Rorty perceives any conflict.
In order to begin to explain this tension, I shall 
explore an autobiographical piece by Rorty, in which he 
weaves these concerns together. It also will help clarify 
what will appear in the next chapter to be a logical 
inconsistency between irony and democracy.
14 Joan C. Williams, "Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism:. The Politics of 
the Gaze," in Brint and Weaver. p. 156.
15 Richard. Rorty, "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", Common Knowledge. 
1990. p. 148.
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Richard Rorty was raised a Trotskyite, He grew up 
"knowing that all decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at 
least socialists... [He] knew that poor people would always be 
oppressed until capitalism was overcome... at twelve, [he] knew 
that the point of being human was to spend one's life 
fighting social injustice."16
In addition to the social concerns with which he was 
raised, Rorty developed very private fascinations which he 
could not link to his Trotskyite social agenda, but which 
were, for inarticulable reasons, equally important to him;
one such interest was in orchids.
Over time, Rorty sought to reconcile his public and 
private concerns, hoping to place them in a framework which 
would allow him to "'hold reality and justice in a single 
vision'" (a phrase he borrowed from W.B. Yeats), He defined 
justice as "the liberation of the weak from the strong." He 
wanted to be "...both an intellectual and spiritual snob and a 
friend of humanity -- a nerdy recluse and a fighter for
justice. "17
While at the University of Chicago, he believed he found 
this in Platonism, the / of which encouraged, among other
things, a dismissal of the thought of John Dewey. Rorty 
became convinced that Socrates was, by nec correct,
16 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p. 142.
I'7 "Trotsky and Che Wild Orchids", p. 14 3.
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virtue was knowledge, because by no other means could Rorty 
be able to hold reality and justice in a single vision- In 
Platonism, Rorty found all of the certainty of religion 
without the requisite humility of religion of which he felt 
incapable. m
Rorty was never a successful Platonist because in 
Platonism he saw two incommensurable goals: irrefutable 
argument and private bliss. The first, importantly for 
Rorty, translated practically into "...becom[ing] able to 
convince the bullies that they should not beat one up, of to 
convince rich capitalists that they must cede their power to 
a cooperative, egalitarian commonwealth," The second goal 
involved attaining a state of perfect (private^ oliss.
Again, Rorty had found equally desirable, but incomsenurable
goals.18 9
Rorty became more and more disillusioned with Platonism 
and Philosophy generally, and progressively more concerned 
that its study would never help him. achieve his social aims.
His doubts were partially assuaged by his discovery of Hegel 
On Rorty's interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit, even 
though philosophy may be no more than holding one's time in 
thought, and redescribing the last generation's redescribers 
this might be enough to "...weave the conceptual, fabric of a
18 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p. 144-145.
19 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p.
IS
u „y , . '
freer, better, more just society." Import,- p Hegel helped 
Rorty get beyond the Platonic concern with reaching a 
perspective beyond the contingencies of time and space which 
would allow the possibility of true understanding of all 
things. 20
Hegel led Rorty back to Dewey {whom, as we shall see, 
was an important figure in his childhood), who had a 
generation earlier reached the same conclusions about the 
untenability of Platonism. Coincident with Rorty's return to 
Dewey was his first encounter with the work of Jacques 
Derrida, whose work led him to read Heidegger. Rorty was 
"...struck by the resemblances between Dewey's, Wittgenstein's, 
and Heidegger's criticisms of Cartesianism." It is unclear 
at what point he encountered Wittgenstein's writings. Rorty 
attempted to blend a criticism of that tradition with 
Hegelian historicism, and a "quasi-Heideggerian story about 
the tensions within Platonism", Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature. He was, however, no closer to reconciling his 
private and public quests.20 1
Eventually, Rorty decided that he had been wrongheaded 
to even attempt to reconcile these two parts of his life.
Only religion could successfully do this; not even Platonism 
could succeed. Rorty had concluded that Plato himself had
20 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p. 146.
21 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p. 146-147.
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failed in this task.
The book around which this work is largely centered 
(particularly the next chapter), Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity, is Rorty's sustained argument that these 
disparate goals, the social and the private, neither can nor 
should be joined. "...One should abjure the temptation to tie 
in one's moral responsibilities to other people with one's 
relation to whatever idiosyncratic things or persons one 
loves... The two will, for some people coincide... but they need 
not coincide, and one should not try too hard to make them."22
Seeing no tension between liberte and egalite, Rorty has 
not tried to address the problem; I will attempt to resolve 
the tension in chapter six.
22 "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids", p. 147.
17
Chapter III 
Rortyan Liberalism: 
Contingent and Ironic
18
Introduction
The idea of Rorty's liberal utopia hinges on his idea of 
the liberal ironist. Rorty's definition of "liberal" is
taken from the late Judith Shklar who defined liberals as
"people who believe that cruelty is worst thing we do."23 * 25
Christopher Norris, a resolute adversary of Rorty's,
defines Rorty's concept of "irony" thus:
...[irony] signifies the readiness to treat 
one's own ideas, attitudes and values as 
a set of shifting and provisional 
beliefs, arrived at through an open-ended 
process of 'self creation' that gives no 
right to pronounce or criticize in 
matters of wider socio-political 
debate. 2 4
Contingency, again defined by Norris, represents:
...the clear eyed recognition that those 
beliefs take rise within, some cultural 
context, or in response to a transient 
phase in the 'conversation of mankind', 
and can therefore claim nothing more in 
the way of ultimate validity or truth.25
An ironist (to which we will come back) is the sort of
person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own 
beliefs and desires. This requires being historicist and 
nominalist enough to abandon the idea that those beliefs and
it 11 u " * f *■ \", n - _ u ; , .___ _ iar1ty,
( t > u ~i ’ ' :> , i * <-> . g. xs
pi f i i i , V > ’ ~ L <• „ , p._y _ j T _______C 1 _
_ _ . t- ' i r W N ’V < d
25 Unciv- --d Theory, pp. 13 7.133.
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desires refer to something timeless.26
Liberal ironists are then people who include among their 
ungroundable desires the hope that suffering will be 
diminished and that humiliation -- the form of suffering 
unique to humans -- will come to an end. There is no answer
to the question "Why not be cruel?" At least there is no 
non-circular justification that cruelty is horrible. There 
need not be one. Anyone who thinks that there are
justifications "out there" or inside of us, is still a 
theologian or metaphysician at heart.27
Such metaphysically oriented or "ontotheological" 
thinkers believe in an order beyond time and change which has 
determined the point of human existence and established a 
hierarchy of responsibilities. This is not necessarily bad, 
just misguided and potentially dangerous when such people try 
to impose their truths (e.g., Lenin, Mao, Hitler).28
What Rorty seeks is a liberal utopia in which ironism is 
universal. People will hold belw fs very strongly and guide 
their actions accordingly, but they will be willing to 
acknowledge that they do not hold them for any deep,
me t aphysica1 reason.
26 " I n t r o du c t i o n " , C on t i noencv.,. o. XV
2 7 "Introduction",, Cont increncv... o. XV
2 8 " I n t r o du c t i on " ,• Contingency.,, p. XV
2 0
In such a culture, a post-metaphysical culture, human 
solidarity would riot be regarded as a fact waiting to be 
recognized or discovered, but as a goal. Solidarity would 
not be achieved by philosophical inquiry, but by imagination 
-- imagining others, strange people as fellow sufferers. 
Solidarity is thus not discovered, but created. It is 
created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular 
details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar 
people.29
This increased sensitivity makes if more difficult to 
marginalize others by thinking "They do not feel it as we 
would." The process of coming to view others as "one of Us" 
rather than as "them" is a matter of detailed redescription 
of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescriptions of
what we are like.
Redescription, as conceived by Rorty is not a task for 
theory and theorists, but for narrative. It is more suitably 
the province of ethnography, journalism, and especially, the
novel. These media let us see the details about the kinds of
suffering being endured by others, and in some cases, the 
sorts of cruelty we are capable of.30 It is for this reason 
that Rorty believes they are gradually replacing both the
2 9 "introduction", Contingency... p. XVI.
30 cf Chs. 5,7 and 8 of Continqency, Irony, and Solidapity.
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sermon and the treatise as the main sources of moral change
and progress.31
In Rorty's liberal utopia, this re ' ment would 
actually be recognized. This recognition would be part of a 
general turn away from theory toward narrative. It would 
amount to a recognition of the contingency of language -- 
recognition that there is no way to step outside of the 
vocabularies we use and find some sort of meta-vocabulary 
encompassing all vocabularies.32
The historicist, nominalist culture Rorty envisions 
would replace the search for the perfect vocabulary with 
narratives connecting the present and past on one hand, and 
utopian futures on the other. It would regard the 
realization of utopias and the imagining of new ones as an 
ongoing, endless process. There would be no telos.
For purposes of clarity, I will now explore Rorty's 
conception of contingency. Pursuant to Forty's own divisions 
I will speak of the Contingency of Language, the Contingency 
of Selfhood, and the Contingency of a Liberal Community.
Each builds upon the preceding: the beliefs of a liberal 
community are based upon the contingent collective odt- 
understandings of individual selves, which are in turn built
31 "Introduction", Contingency..., p. XVI .
32 "introduction", Contingency..., p. XVI.
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upon wholly contingent vocabularies. Given the cent / of
the concepts discussed here to Rorty's view, I will explore 
them and their implications in depth.
The Contingency of Language
"...since truth is a property of sentences, since
sentences are dependent upon vocabularies, and since
vocabularies are made by humans, so are truths . "33
We must start with Rorty' s claim, first intimated in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, that there is no sense
in which any description is an accurate representation of the 
way the world is in itself. We need to get beyond the idea 
that anything (mind, matter, self, world) has an intrinsic
nature to be expressed or represented. The Eighteenth 
Century German Idealists confused this belief with the belief 
that the world is not "out there", thus giving us Kant's
belief in the noumenal world, a variant on Plato's world of
essences. Rorty believes the idealists to have gone in the 
wrong dir ec tion.
Rorty feels that we need to make a distinction between 
the claim that the world is out there, and that truth is out
there. To say that the world is out there is only to say 
that it is not our creation, that most positivities are the *
33 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Language* in Cont inqehcv, Irony, 
and) Solidarity. Cambridge University Press. 1989. p. 21.
2 3
effects of causes which do not include human minds. To say 
that truth is not out there is to say that where there are no 
sentences, there is no truth. Given that sentences are 
elements of human languages, and that human languages are 
human creations, truth cannot be out there. Truth cannot
exist independent of the human mind because sentences cannot
so exist.34 35
The world is thus out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or 
false. The world on its own -- unaided by the describing 
activities of humans and their languages -- cannot be. Rorty 
sees the suggestion that the truth exists independent of 
humans as the residue of a period when the world was seen as 
the "creation of a being who had a language of his own."33
The conflation of the platitude that the world may 
cause us to be justified in believing a sentence to be true
with the claim that the world contains "facts" is facilitated
by confining attention to single sentences, rather than whole
vocabularies. We often let the world decide between
alternate sentences, but this makes it easy to confuse the 
fact that the world contains the causes of our being 
justified in holding a belie’ with the claim that some
34 "The Contingency of Language", pp. 4-5.
35 "The Contingency of Language", p. 5.
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nonlinguistic state is an example of truth. This is not as 
likely to occur when dealing with whole vocabularies rather 
than sentences; when we deal with alternative language games, 
it is difficult to think of the world as making one language 
game better than another . 36
When the notion of "description of the world" changes 
from the level of criteria-governed sentences within language 
games to language games as wholes, the idea that the world 
decides which descriptions are true is no longer sensible.
It becomes difficult to believe that there is one true
vocabulary out there waiting to be found.
For Rorty and other philosophers who have taken the 
linguistic turn, the world does not speak, only persons do.
It can cause us to have beliefs once we have language, but it
cannot provide us with language; only other humans (language 
users) do this. This does not imply that the choice of 
language game is arbitrary or, conversely, that it is an 
expression of something intrinsic; such notions are no longer 
relevant when dealing with choices between language games. 3?
For Rorty, most of reality is indifferent to human 
descriptions of it; it is primarily the human self that is 
affected by description. The self is created by the use of a * *
36 "The Contingency of Language", p. 5.
37 "The Contingency of Language", p. 6.
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vocabulary- It is not, however, well represented or poorly 
represented or expressed in a vocabulary. Anything can be 
made to look good or bad by being redescribed; a talent for 
speaking differently, rather than for arguing well, is, for 
Rorty, the chief instrument, of social change.
Any belief formerly thought absurd or repugnant can be 
made to look good, just as, conversely, what had always been 
regarded as a natural truth, or something to which one had 
become resigned, can be represented in terms which make it 
look repugnant. This is, as Rorty puts it, "altering the 
data of moral theory." One way of doing this for Rorty is to 
provide a new language to facilitate new reactions.38
Political Utopians, who number among Rorty's cultural 
heroes beside novelists and poets, do not claim that human 
nature is repressed by "unnatural" institutions, but that 
changes in language and other social practices .may produce 
new sorts-of people (novelists awaken us to the suffering of 
those around us, poets help change language,and political 
Utopians go to work on the ground prepared by novelists and 
poets, not in a revolutionary way, but in a piecemeal, 
reformist way). To say that there is no such thing as 
intrinsic nature is not to say that the intrinsic nature of 
reality turned out to be extrinsic, just that the term is not
38 Richard Rorty, "Feminism and Pragmatism", Michi gag,.Quarter1y Re yiew.
30 Spring, 1991, pp. 232-233.
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very useful. Similarly, saying that we should drop the idea 
that the truth is out there is not the same as claiming that 
we have discovered that there is no truth, which would, of 
course, be a self-refuting truth claim,39
Philosophers, Rorty claims, should not be asked to argue 
about such topics because, "[The] trouble with arguments 
against the use of familiar and time honored vocabularies is 
that they are expected to be phrased in that very 
vocabulary." They are expected to show that the central 
elements of that vocabulary are inconsistent in their own
terms.40
For Rorty, interesting philosophy is not usually 
argument, over the merits of a thesis, but more often a
contest between "an entrenched vocabulary which has become a 
nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely 
promises great things."41
The method at work here is to redescribe lots of things 
in new ways, until a new pattern of linguistic behavior has- 
been created, and hopefully, eventually adopted. This change 
in linguistic behavior will also hopefully yield changes in 
nonlinguistic behavior. Rorty sees this process not as
39 "The Contingency of Language",, pp., 7-8
40 "The Cont ingency of Language",, p. 8 .
41 "The Contingency of Language".■ P. 9.
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working in piecemeal fashion, but "he 1 ’',f .cully and
pragmatically." It involves the suggestion that we stop 
doing the same (old) things and try new ones. This is not 
based on arguments based on criteria shared by both 
vocabularies, because, by definition, given the new language 
game, there will not be shared criteria.42
To build upon these claims and investigate their 
implications for social change, Rorty explores the work of 
Donald Davidson. What is most important about Davidson's 
work is that he abandons the notion of language as a medium. 
In the traditional view of humanity, humans are not simply 
networks of beliefs and desires, but beings which have those
beliefs and desires in addition to a core self which can
evaluate and choose between them. This gives us a picture of
the essential core of the self on one side of the network
with the world on the other; i.e., the subject-object
dichotomy. The idealists tried and failed to replace this
conception. The Linguistic Turn centered around substituting 
language for self as a medium, but this proved to be
ineffective, merely placing language between the network and 
the world. This led to the idealization and reification of
language.43
42 "The Contingency of Language", p. 9.
43 "The Contingency of Language", p. 10.
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Davidson does not. view language as a medium of 
expression or representation; he is thus able to set aside
the idea that either the self or the world has an intrinsic
nature. His thinking thus resembles that of Wittgenstein in 
treating alternate vocabularies like alternate tools and not 
as parts of a whole. Following Wittgenstein, we are thus 
able to focus on tne efficiency of the (linguistic) tools. 
Given this, we see that revolutionary achievements occur when 
someone realizes that two of our vocabularies are interfering 
with each other and invents a new one to replace them.
The creation of a new vocabulary is not a discovery 
about how the old ones fit together. The invention of a new 
vocabulary makes possible the formulation of its own purpose; 
it is the tool for doing something which could not have been 
thought of prior to the development of descriptions made 
possible by the new vocabulary.44
The idea that language has a purpose is no longer 
helpful once the idea of language as a medium goes.
"Davidson lets us think of the history of language, and thus 
culture, as Darwin taught, us to think, of the history of a 
coral reef. Old metaphors are constantly dying off into 
literalness, then serving as platform and foil for new 
metaphors." This allows us to view our language as the
44 "The Contingency of Language"', pp. 11-12.
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result of multiple contingencies.45
Following this point, we need to view the difference 
between the literal and the metaphorical not as a distinction 
between two types of meaning or interpretation, but as the
difference between familiar and unfamiliar uses of words. We
can handle literal uses with our old theories, but 
metaphorical uses force us to develop new theories. We 
should not think of metaphoric expressions as having meanings 
distinct from literal ones, because to have a meaning is to 
have a place in a language game, which, by definition, 
metaphors do not.46
To use a sentence which does not have a place in a 
language game is to utter something neither true nor false; 
it can only be liked or disliked. It may, in time, become a 
"truth value candidate." If it is liked, it may be repeated, 
and gradually require habitual use; at this point it will no 
longer be a metaphor.47
Changing the way we talk will, for Rorty, yield changes 
in what we want to do and what we think we are, and thus, fox' 
our purposes, what we are. This means that there are no 
problems which bind the generations together. This sense of
45 "The Contingency of Language", p. 16.
46 "The Contingency of Language", pp. 17-18,
47 Rorty says that we may alternately call it a dead metaphor, "what 
most sentences of our language are." "The Contingency of Language", p. 18.
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human history as the history of successive metaphors lets us 
see "the poet, in the generic sense of the maker of new 
words, the shaper of new languages, as the vanguard of the 
species. "48
The world does not provide us with any criterion of 
choice between alternate metaphors; we can only compare them 
with one another, or with something outside of language 
called "fact". To drop the idea of language as
representation and to be thoroughly Wittgensteinian in 
approach to language would be to de-divinize the world. Only 
if we do this can we accept the claim with which I opened 
this section, "...since truth is a property of sentences, since 
sentences are dependent upon vocabularies, and since
vocabularies are made by humans, so are truths. "4‘3
We thus have no prelinguistic consciousness to which 
language needs to be adequate; "what is described as such a 
consciousness is simply a disposition to use the language of 
our ancestors, to worship the corpses of their metaphors."50
48 "The Contingency of Language", p. 20.
49 "The Contingency of Language", pp. 20-21
50 "The Contingency of Language", p, 21.
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The Contingency of Selfhood,
Rorty's discussion of the contingent nature of the self
centers around the tension between the effort to achieve self 
creation through recognition of contingency, and through the 
effort to achieve universality by transcending contingency.
In the classical world, this was played out in the quarrel 
between philosophy and poetry; since Hegel, and particularly 
since Nietzsche, this has been going on within philosophy.51
The philosophers Rorty takes as important have broken 
with Plato, and see freedom as the recognition of 
contingency; they take Hegel's insistence on historicity and 
combine it with Nietzsche's identification of the "strong
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and end by surrendering philosophy to poetry.52
It was Nietzsche, Rorty claims, who first suggested that 
we drop the whole idea of "knowing the truth", and 
"representing reality" with language; he was thereby
and £
51 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Selfhood" 
Cambridge University Press. 1989. p.
nicy, Irony,
9 9
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suggesting that we not try to find a single context for all 
human lives. Once we follow Nietzsche in believing that 
Plato's "true world", the world of essences, was only a 
fable, we would at death find our comfort not in having been 
more than animal, but by being an animal who, "...by describing 
himself in his own terms had created himself." He would, in 
other words, have created his own mind, all that matters. To 
create one's own mind is to create one's own language rather 
than be dependent on the language others had left behind 
("the corpses of our ancestors' metaphors").53
In this Nietzschean schema, self-knowledge, that which 
the tradition from Plato onward had sought, is, in fact, (or 
more apropos of pragmatism, more usefully thought of as) 
self-creation. It is not the discovery of the self's nature, 
but the process of creating a self by inventing a new 
language, new metaphors.
If we follow Davidson's position on the 
literal/metaphorical distinction, and drop the notion of 
language fitting the world, we can see the point of 
Nietzsche's claim that the "maker, the person who uses words 
in new ways, is best able to appreciate her own contingency." 
Thus, for Nietzsche, only the poet can truly appreciate 
contingency; most of us try to escape it. Rorty concedes 
that strong poets are the causal products of natural forces,
53 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 27.
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but what is different about them is that they are capable of 
telling the story "in words never used before,"54
For Nietzsche, the criterion for a worthwhile life is
how well it escaped from the inherited descriptions of the 
contingencies of its existence and finds new ones,
Nietzsche's appeal, given its generally sneering tone, 
is limited. In finding a way to bridge Mietzsche to 
everyman, Rorty finds Freud very useful. Freud "...helps us 
accept, and put to work, this Nietzschean... sense of what it 
is to be a full-fledged human being." Rorty sees Freud as 
the moralist who helped de-divinize the self beatified by 
Kant by "tracking conscience home to its origin in the 
contingencies of our upbringing."55
Freud de-universalizes Kant's moral sense, making it 
idiosyncratic and contingent; he thus allows us to see moral 
consciousness as historically contingent, Freud presents 
conscience as the renewal of guilt of repressed experiences 
which are the products of countless contingencies that never 
enter (conscious) experience- This is not a new position, 
but Freud gives it greater depth and detail than had ever 
before been suggested. For example, Freud's concept of the 
"narcissistic origin of compassion" gives us a way to think
54 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 28.
55 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 3Qo
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of pity not as the identification with a common core we all 
share, getting us beyond Plato and Kant without merely 
inverting them as had Nietzsche,56
Freud res us with a self which is a tissue of
contingencies rather than at least potentially well-ordered 
system of faculties," He thus gives each of us the equipment 
to construct a private vocabulary of moral deliberation.
This enables us to sketch a narrative of our own development 
which can be far better suited to each individual than
anything philosophy has ever offered. Moral deliberation can 
thus become as detailed as prudential calculation had been;
this thus results in the break-down of the distinction
between moral guilt and practical inadvisability, further 
yielding a dismantling of the prudence-morality distinction.57
In this scheme, rationality is nothing more than a 
mechanism to help adjust contingencies to other 
contingencies, allowing us to see morality and prudence not 
as products of distinct faculties as Kant would have it, but 
as alternate modes of adaptation to contingency.
For Freud, only if we catch hold of some crucial 
contingency in our past can we make something worthwhile of 
ourselves. We should thus "...praise ourselves by weaving
56 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 30-31.
57 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 32.
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idiosyncratic narratives... of our success in sell creation, 
our ability to break from an idiosyncratic past" and 
"...condemn ourselves for failure to break free of that past 
rather than for failure to live up to universal standards."58
Freud -- and in the next section this will be central to 
Rorty -- dist mguishes sharply between the private ethic of 
self-creation and the public ethic of mutual accommodation, 
finding no bridge provided by universally shared beliefs or 
desires. This is because our private goals are as
idiosyncratic as the unconscious obsessions and phobias from 
which they originate. As such, Freudian moral psychology 
cannot be used to define social goals; Freud is not a moral 
philosopher who supplies universal criteria.59
Freud thus turns us away from the universal to the 
concrete, providing us with a moral psychology which is 
broadly compatible with Nietzsche's attempt to see the strong 
poet as our archetype. Freud's approach does not entail 
Nietzsche because Freu 1 i ‘bus the idea of an archetypal 
human; humanity is not a natural kind with an intrinsic
nature. so
"By breaking with both Kant's 
residual Platonism and Nietzsche's
58 "Cont ingency of Sel fhood" ,■ P- 3 3
5 9 "Contingency of Selfhood",> P- 34
60 " C o n t i n g e n cy of Selfhood"o■ P- 3 5
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inverted Platonism,he lets us see both 
Nietzsche's superman and Kant's common 
moral consciousness as exemplifying two 
forms of adaptation."61
Contrary to Nietzsche's claim, no one is truly dull, 
because there is no such thing as a dull unconscious. Thanks 
to Freud, we can see every life as a poem. No life is so 
racked by pain as to be unable to learn a language or create 
a self-description.62
The Contingency of a Liberal Community
My central claim about Rorty in this section is that a 
liberal society is better served by a vocabulary of moral and 
political reflection which is informed by the discussions in 
the previous two sections. Although the "vocabulary of 
Enlightenment rationalism... was essential to the beginnings of 
liberal democracy, [it] has become an impediment to the 
preservation and progress of democratic societies." A 
vocabulary centered on metaphors of self-creation would be 
better suited. Such a vocabulary would not provide
foundations, because the notion of philosophical foundations 
loses its utility when rationalism is abandoned. This
61 "Contingency of Selfhood", p. 35.
62 This does not, as we shall see, mean that we can generate a 
language; of the oppressed, because some are too oppressed to create a new 
language, and are thus stuck with the language of their oppressors, and 
potentially, only their oppressors' descriptions.
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vocabulary would thus not ground democracy, but permit its 
practices and goal to be redescribed. 63
"... [I]n its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would 
be one which was enlightened, secular, through and through." 
In it would be no trace of divinity, nor room for the belief
that there are non-human forces to which humans are
responsible. Its citizens would be:
...no longer able to see any use for the 
notion that finite, mortal, contingently 
existing human beings might derive 
meanings of their lives from anything 
except, other finite, mortal contingently 
existing human beings.63 4
The liberal societies of our century have produced more 
and more people able to recognize the contingency of the 
vocabulary in which they state their highest hopes (what we 
will call in the next section their "final vocabulary"), yet
remain faithful to them.
Given this, most now accept that there is no framework
within which one can meaningfully ask, "".If freedom has no 
morally privileged status, if it is just one value among 
many, then what can be said for liberalism?'" We no longer 
assume that we must explain things by reference to something
63 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of a Liberal Community" in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge University Press. 1989. p. 44.
64 "Contingency of Community", p. 15.
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outside the contingencies of our particular situation.65
If we take Rorty's position seriously, we can no longer
claim to be able to decide between values to see which are
morally privileged because we have no way to rise above our 
particular situation and its language game to compare it with 
all others based upon some neutral criteria.
For Rorty, what is a central tenet for liberal society 
is that "with regard to words as opposed to deeds, anything 
goes." Openmindedness should be fostered for its own sake. 
With regard to the problem of truth discussed previously in 
this chapter, liberal societies accept that whatever position 
wins out in a free and open encounter is true. Rorty 
believes, furthermore that trying to philosophically ground 
liberal democracy is detrimental because that necessarily 
enshrines claims that are not the outcome of free and open 
encounters, but are prior to them. 66
The upshot is that what liberal societies need are 
improved self-descriptions, not new foundations. This need 
for foundations Rorty traces back to Enlightenment scientism, 
which was a secularized version of the much earlier religious 
need for otherworldly authority. As such, the Enlightenment 
turned the scientist into a secular priest; Rorty
66 "Contingency of Community", pp. 46-50.
66 "Contingency of Community", pp. 50-52.
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acknowledges that this may have been useful in its time, but 
is no longer. We should replace the scientist with the 
artist and the utopian politician, but we must not venerate 
them. They are simply representatives of those sectors of 
our culture which excite change in the way in which the
scientists used to.67
This means, for Rorty, that we should "poeticize" 
culture in the same way the Enlightenment tried to scieritize 
it. We should "...substitute the hope that chances for 
fulfillment of idiosyncratic fantasies will be equalized for 
the hope that everyone will replace 'passion' or fantasy with
reason. "68
Rorty's ideal society would, as stated earlier, have the 
strong poet as its cultural hero;69 in keeping with the 
presuppositions of such a claim, Rorty further claims that we 
would no longer assume that a society is no stronger than its 
philosophical foundation. We would be able, in fact, to 
dispose of the idea of philosophical, foundations entirely.
67 "Contingency of Community”, p. 52 .
68 "Cont ingency o f Communi ty" , p. 53 .
69 t find this claim problematic 
should, lionize the strong poet for her
On the one hand, 
roles m helping us
Rorty says we
c r e a t e o u c offimu n a 1
self-description. On the other hand, the ironism of the strong poet,
presumably the impulse which guides her toward her redescriptive activity, is 
according to Rorty, at best, politically useless. It would seem more useful 
to say that the last generation's strong poet should be our hero, because this 
generation's is -- unless scrupously following Rorty's admonition to privatize 
her quest for self-creation at work underminig our self-descriptions.
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The only justification a liberal society we would need would 
be invidious comparison with other societies known in history 
or put forth as ideals. Allegiance to one's society also
ceases to be a matter of reference to external criteria.70 71
Three of Rorty's heroes, Dewey, Oakeshott and Rawls have 
been central to undermining the idea that there can be a set
of concepts that can ground liberalism across time and 
culture.7i Rorty feels that this "undermining" has actually 
helped to strengthen liberal institutions because it has
freed them from any need to defend themselves
philosophically. Rorty says of these thinkers: "Their 
pragmatism is antithetical to Enlightenment rationalism, 
although it was itself made possible... only by that 
rationalism. It can serve as the vocabulary of a mature (de- 
scientized, de-philosophized) Enlightenment liberalism."72
A further upshot of this move is the at the societal 
level, the morality-prudence distinction, as with the term 
"moral" itself, is no longer very useful. "'Moral
70 "Contingency of Community", p. 53-54.
71 Initially, Rorty read Rawls as doing just that, but no longer sees 
his attempts in this way (cf Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy", 
Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume I. Cambridge 
University Press. 1991).
The inclusion of Oakeshott, a strongly conservative Aristotelian, is 
puzzling, but the quotations which Rorty provides ("Contingency of Community", 
pp. 57-60) seem to support his reading.
72 "Contingency of Community", p. 57.
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principles' only have a point insofar as they incorporate 
tacit reference to a whole range of institutions, practices 
and vocabularies of moral and political deliberation." They 
are reminders of such practices, not their justifications.
If the dichotomy has any use, it is in terms of the 
difference between appeal to the interest of the community, 
and to individual interests. There is no longer something 
that stands to the community as the community stands to the 
individual; there is no humanity with an intrinsic nature.77
At the level of the social the morality-prudence 
distinction is no longer useful because it presupposes an 
intrinsic nature of humanity beyond the contingent traits of 
any contingent Society. However, the demands of morality are 
the demands of a language, and languages are the creations of 
(contingent) humans. To obey a moral requirement is to 
identify with such a contingency.
For Rorty, a liberal society is one in which society's 
needs can be met by persuasion rather than force; it has no
desire except freedom.73 4
It is a society whose- hero is the strong 
poet and the revolutionary because it 
recognizes that it is what it is, has the 
morality it has, speaks the language? it
73 "Contingency of Community", pp. 58-59.
74 Rorty's claim at this point is in direct contradiction of his 
strongly egalitarian, quasi-Marxist, sentiments. I will address this tension 
be1ow.
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does, not because it approximates the 
will of God or the nature of man, but 
because certain poets and. revolutionaries 
of the past spoke as they did.75
This all gives us Rorty's conception of the liberal 
ironist, a person with a sense of the contingency of "their 
language of moral deliberation, and thus their consciences, 
and thus their community... combined commitment with a sense of 
the contingency of their own commitment."75
Irony and Liberalism: Public and Private
...the fact that you have obligations to 
other people... does not entail that what 
you share with other people is more 
important than anything else. What you 
share with them, when you are aware of 
such moral obligations, is not...
"rationality" or "human nature"... or 
anything other than ability to sympathize 
with the pain of others. There is no 
particular reason to expect that your 
sensitivity to that pain, and your 
idiosyncratic loves, are going to fit. 
within one big overall account of how 
everything hangs together.77
Rorty recognizes a prima facie tension between the quest 
for self-creation, what Foucault calls autonomy, and
commitment to a liberal community. His solution is to 
privatize efforts at self-creation and autonomy. Before
7 5 "Contingency of Community", p. 61.
7 6 "Contingency o f C ommuni ty", p. 61.
77 "Trotsky and the Whid Orchids " ■, p. 14 8 .
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discussing his proposed solution, I shall first examine the 
problem in more detail.
"All human beings carry about a set of words which they
employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their
lives... call these words a person's 'final vocabulary.'" Rorty
considers it final in the sense that if the vocabulary is
challenged, its user has no way to argue on its behalf that
does not employ terms taken from the vocabulary itself; it
is, Rorty says, as far as the user can go with language.
I shall define an "ironist as someone who 
fulfills three conditions: (1) She has 
radical and continuing doubts about the 
final vocabulary she currently uses, 
because she has been impressed by other 
vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final 
by people or books she has encountered;
(2) she realizes that argument phrased in 
her present vocabulary can neither 
underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) 
insofar as she philosophizes about her 
situation, she does not think that her 
vocabulary is closer to reality than 
others .78
Such persons are, Rorty claims, naturally inclined to 
liberalism, particularly the negative liberty afforded the 
intellectual by a liberal society. In keeping with the 
attitudes discussed in the sections on contingency, ironists 
are both nominalist and historicist, recognizing that nothing 
has an intrinsic nature. They also recognize that, all of the 
searches for individuals' correct language games are not
78 Richard Rorty, "Private irony and Liberal Hope" in Cont.ingency,
Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge ’diva "'y I me. 1989. p. 73.
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going to converge upon the one, true vocabulary. They worry 
that they may be playing the wrong language game given the 
particular contingencies of their upbringing, and may thus be 
the wrong sort of person. They cannot, however, give any 
sort of criteria as to what may qualify as a "right" or 
"wrong" type of person.7?
They have abandoned the search for "truth", regarding 
"truth" as "simply a platitude used to inculcate the local 
and final vocabulary." Their ironism is in part defined by 
Rorty as not containing such notions as "truth".
When arguing, ironists tend to choose dialectic, because 
the primary unit of dialectic is the vocabulary, not a single 
proposition within a language game. As discussed in the 
previous sections, the method of choice for the ironist is 
redescription.
Rather than philosophy, the ironist finds Literary 
Criticism -- when conceived of as "placing books in the 
context of other books -- a helpful tool. It is this 
comparative method that ironists find attractive, given their 
Davidsonian attitude that there is nothing to compare a 
vocabulary against except another. At the level of the self, 
there is nothing that can assuage the ironist's doubts about 
herself except greater acquaintance with others. It is for 
that reason that they find literary critics helpful moral
79 "Private Irony and Liberal Hope", pp. 73-75.
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advisers (but no more than advisers); Critics have a larger 
range of acquaintance than most people.80
By Rorty's definition, however, "Literature" now 
encompasses almost any book with any conceivable moral value, 
which given Rorty's nominalism means simply any book that 
might change what one considers important.
The liberal ironist has no desire for power because she 
is properly ironic about her vision and her influence. The 
ironist will not be bothered by the thought that her 
redescriptions and vocabularies will be viewed by her 
successors as "mere redescriptions." The perfection the 
ironist seeks is a private perfection; she wants only to be 
left alone to pursue it. There is, however, an important 
public role for ironists. This role is linked to the fairly 
tight historical connections "...between the freedoms of
intellectuals on the one hand and the decrease of cruelty on
the other."81
Rorty seeks to separate the public realm from the 
private for a number of reasons, the first of which is to 
defend ironism. Jurgen Habermas, a philosopher, social 
theorist and leading contemporary member of the Frankfurt 
School, finds the ironism which Rorty celebrates "destructive
80 "private Irony and Liberal Hope", pp. 76-80.
8! "Contingency of Community", p. 61.
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of social hope." Rorty sees it as largely irrelevant to 
public life and political questions; its use lies in the 
attempt to form an individual's self image. Habermas' 
resistance to irony lies in his Marxist trots: he believes 
that the value of any philosophy lies in its political 
implications; because ironists draw no (intrinsic) political 
implications, Habermas views them as inherently
conservative.82 * *
In Rorty's ideal society, the intellectuals would, be 
ironists, but everyone else would not, although they would be 
"commonsensically nominalist and historicist." They would 
view themselves as contingent, but would not have any doubts 
about the contingencies they embody. What separates
intellectuals and non-intellectuals in Rorty's liberal utopia 
is doubt. Particularly attractive about this arrangement is 
that its citizens would not need to justify the sense of 
human solidarity they feel because they are no longer raised 
fa day such a language game where philosophical
justification is considered important. When doubts about 
social arrangements are voiced, they are responded to with 
requests for concrete alternatives, not philosophical
82 "Private Irony and Liberal Hope", p. 83. Rorty offers no citation.
for Habermas' claim, but see generally, Habermas, The Phi losopfair.: .
m Modernity. MIT Press, 1987.
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argumentation.83
Rorty recognizes very plainly that no society's public 
rhetoric can be ironist, because irony is "an inherently 
private matter." An ironist must have something to be ironic 
about, to have doubts about.
Another possible objection to ironism is its possibly 
humiliating potential. As discussed previously, ironism is, 
in part, a recognition of the power of redescription, but 
most people do not want to be redescribed. The ironist tells 
them that their language, their final vocabulary is "up for 
grabs." This is, Rorty concedes, potentially very cruel, 
because the easiest way to humiliate a person is by making 
what they cherish most (what is enshrined in their final 
vocabulary) and make it seem unimportant84,
When this is combined with the fact that ironists do not
link redescription and emancipation, and that they state that 
freedom comes from historical contingencies mostly unaffected 
by redescription, we see that the problem is not that 
ironists are prone to humiliating others, but that they 
simply cannot empower others.85
The only thing which Rorty believes needs redescription
83
84
Private
Private
Irony and Liberal
Irony and Liberal
p. 87.
p. 89.
Hope",
Hope",
85 "Private Irony and Liberal Hope", pp. 90-91.
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is that which will serve Liberal aims: answers to the
question "What humiliates?" The aim of the liberal ironist is 
to decrease the likelihood of anyone being humiliated by 
increasing our ability to recognize humiliation through 
redescription of what is humiliating.
However, Rorty is aware that people simply do not want 
to be redescribed; for this reason Rorty distinguishes 
between redescription for private purposes and for public 
purposes. Private redescriptions may describe anyone in
terms
which have nothing to do with my attitude 
toward your actual or possible suffering.
My private purposes and the part of my 
final vocabulary which is not relevant to 
my public actions, are none of your 
business.86
The only part of a person's final vocabulary which is 
relevant to the rest of her society is the part which 
requires her to be aware of the ways in which her actions may 
cause the humiliation of others. It is this susceptibility
to humiliation which links the liberal ironist with the rest
of her society.
People oppressed by cruelty are unable to engage in the 
language game of reflection, because pain makes them "mute". 
More true to Rorty's language elsewhere, they can use only 
the language of their oppressors and. can describe thei s
86 "Private Irony and Liberal Hope", 
4 9
p. 91.
using only the descriptions used by their oppressors. There 
can thertfne be no "voice of the oppressed" or "language of 
the victim", because the language which used to be
sufficient, the only one they know, is no longer working and 
they are suffering too much to put new words into action. It 
is the (ironist) intellectual who has the essential role of 
putting the situation of the- victim into language. The 
liberal novelist, poet and journalist are skillful at 
imaginative identification of this sort; they are able to 
imagine a language for those who cannot speak for
themselves. 87
Ironism presents another, more serious problem; some 
ironists intellectuals do not wish to keep their irony to 
themselves. Three of Rorty's favorite ironists, Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Foucault, all see, to a greater or lesser 
extent, public, political relevance for their theories; it is 
for this reason also that Rorty seeks to maintain the public- 
private split.
Foucault at times tries to combine his attempts at self- 
creation, what Rorty, following Foucault, calls his "quest 
for autonomy", with the institutions of a liberal society. 
Rorty believes strongly that such desires should be kept 
private, because the sort of autonomy Foucault and others
87 Honi Fern Haber, Beyond.Postmodern. Politics Lyotard,.. Rorty.
ucault. Rout ledge. 19 94. p. 52.
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seek can definitionally not be embodied in institutions. 
Autonomy is not something we all have within us waiting to be 
released, and certainly not something that any institution 
could release. It is something made, not found, and it is 
not particularly relevant to the liberal desire to avoid
humiliation.88
To have an autonomous, self-created self an ironist must 
cut the links which binds her vocabulary to those of the rest 
of her society. This does not, however, entail, cutting the 
social bonds which link her to her society, nor using that 
society's political vocabulary.88 9
By keeping this quest private, we keep ourselves from.
developing political attitudes (as Nietzsche and Heidegger
did) which lead to the belief that there is some social goal
more important than avoiding cruelty. It is when ironists
want their private self to serve as a model that their
politics tend to cease being liberal.
When he begins to think that other human 
beings have a moral duty to achieve the 
same inner autonomy as he himself has 
achieved, then he begins to think about 
political and social changes which will 
help them do so. Then he may begin to 
think that he has a moral duty to bring 
about these changes, whether his fellow
88 "Contingency of Community", p. 65.
89 Richard Rorty, "Moral identity and Private Autonomy: The Case of
Foucault" in Essays.—onJleigeac^^ . Philosophical Papers Volume 2 .
Cambridge University Press. 1991. pp. 193-194.
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citizens want them or not.
For this reason, ironist philosophers are socially and
politically "useless" and potentially dangerous."
The Romantic intellectual's goal of self- 
overcoming and self-invention seems to me 
a good model... for an individual human 
being, but a very bad model for a 
society. We should not try to find a 
societal counterpart to the desire for 
autonomy. Trying to do so leads to 
Hitlerlike and Maolike fantasies about 
"creating a new kind of human being."
Societies are not quasi-persons. The 
point of a liberal society is not to 
create anything, but simply to make it as 
easy as possible for people to achieve 
their wildly different private ends 
without hurting each other.91
We should ask ironists to privatize their attempts at 
sublimity, and "to view them as irrelevant to politics and 
therefore compatible with the sense of human solidarity which 
the development of democratic institutions has facilitated."92
There are many criticisms of Rorty's public-private 
split. Feminists, for example, are concerned that it is a 
revitalization of the oppressive sexual division of labor. 
Others believe that it is merely a rehashing of a discredited 
Hellenic ideal. Hopefully, it has been made clear that it Is
y9 "Contingency of Community", p. 68; "Moral identity and Private 
Autonomy: The Case of Foucault", p. 194.
91 "Moral Identity and Private Autonomy: The Case o£ Foucault", p. 196.
92 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity", in ContingencyIrony, and Solidai 9;’ 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. p. 197.
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neither of these things. Rorty has addressed the first
allegation directly, stating:
The kind of private/public distinction 
the feminists mostly talk about is the 
distinction between who stays home and 
does the dirty work with the cooking and 
kids, and who gets out of the house into 
the great world outside. That has nothing 
to do with the distinction I'm trying to 
draw between individual self-creation and 
public responsibility.93
In the next chapter, we will explore some of the 
critiques and alternatives to Rorty's view of liberal 
society, and particularly his conception of social change
93 "A Post-Philosophical Politics?", p. 202.
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...philosophical thought... [has] relatively 
little to do with the reach of political 
imagination. It seems to me a sign of 
despair, and therefore of failing 
imaginations, when a left becomes as 
philosophized, as preoccupied with 
theory, as the academic left in the 
United States presently is. The fantasy 
that a new set of philosophical ideas... 
can do quickly and wholesale what union 
organizers, journalistic exposes, 
activist lawyers, charismatic leftist 
candidates, and the like can do, at best, 
very slowly and at retail, seems to me 
the result of a failure of nerve. 94
In this chapter, we explore Rorty's response to the
various challengers to the piecemeal, pragmatist conception
of social change. They can be thought of as a group under
the rubric "immanent critique"; each of the traditions here 
identified is, to Rorty's mind, more prone to criticism,
particularly ideologiekritik, than to action. The ideology 
always criticized is the bourgeois ideology of late 
capitalism.95
Most are outgrowths of Marxism, but have abandoned 
Marx's own valorization of praxis over critique.
94 Richard Rorty, "What Can You Expect from Antifoundational 
Philosophers?: A Reply to Lynn Baker." 78 Virginia Law Review. 1992. pp. 723- 
724 .
95 "Thugs and Theorists", p. 569.
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Pragmatism, Neopragmatism and Change
In addition to the novel, about which we have spoken, 
and will address again below, and to metaphor, Rorty 
identifies two other means for social change, reformist 
activism, which is the concept central to Rorty's Deweyan 
position, and Prophecy. Rorty addresses Prophecy only in one 
place. 96
In this piece, he nicely synopsizes his position, but 
changes vocabulary; this is ostensibly done to remain 
continuous with the language of Lynn Baker's piece, "Just Do 
It: Pragmatism and Social Change", but the term "Prophet" 
nicely encapsulates Rorty's idea. 97
Rorty identifies two types of prophet, good and bad.
Good prophets say that if we all got together and did % , we
would probably like, the results. They provide an idea of 
what a better future might look like and how it might be 
achieved. They make no claims to "legitimacy" or "truth" 
(certainly not "Truth").96 97 8
Bad prophets consider themselves the voice of something 
bigger and more authoritative than the possible consequences
96 "What Can You Expect...", p. 719.
97 Lynn A. Baker, "Just Do It: Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change"
78 Virginia Law Review. 1992.
98 "What Can 'You Expect...", p. 719.
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of their ideas; a messenger from some authority in the name 
of which they speak. They thereby defend their proposals by 
the authority with which they speak.99
This first type of prophet will not be inclined to 
engage in philosophical debate about her prophecy; when 
forced to do so, it is useful to have a philosopher around, 
particularly, Rorty claims, a pragmatist philosopher. The 
pragmatist philosopher would essentially run interference 
while the prophet engages in the important work.
Theoretical Marxism and Pragmatism
Rorty is still wed to much of, if not Marxism, at least
(Romantic) Socialism. For him, Marx and the tradition went
wrong when it tried to scientize itself, hence his claim that
Dewey took what was useful from Marx and discarded the
rest.99 100
It is for this reason that Rorty feels we need to 
"banalize our vocabulary of political deliberation." For 
Rorty, we should start talking about greed and selfishness 
rather than constructs such as "bourgeois ideology". 
Highlighting a point which will recur throughout this 
chapter, Rorty states that we should stop assuming that the
99 "What Can You Expect.,.", pp. 719-720.
100 Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists", p. 568.
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role of the intellectual is radical critique of existing 
institutions -- criticism that attempts to penetrate down to 
the realities beneath the appearances. As we have seen, 
Rorty rejects this metaphysical urge in all of its
manifestations, but he finds it particularly pernicious in 
the political realm.101
For Rorty, it is better to say that we may be able to 
construct a better society than we have now, than to try to 
see through "mystification" and social construction to 
reality. Even here the vocabulary must be kept banal. The 
better society which we should seek to create (the liberal 
utopia of chapters II and III, with perhaps greater emphasis 
placed on economic equality) should not be thought of as 
conforming better to the way things really are (or should 
be), but merely containing fewer inequities, because, for 
purely contingent reasons, that is what we -- the 'we' of 
Rorty's credo discussed in chapter two value. For such a
task, what is needed is reformist criticism; such criticism 
implies in Rorty's usage that the critic sketch alternate 
institutions. These alternate institutions, paralleling his 
warnings about why ironists must keep their projects private 
must not presuppose the existence or creation of a new kind 
of person. Rather than try to avoid complicity with present
101 Richard Rorty, "The intellectuals at the Enel of Socialism" The 
Yale Review. v8/l&2, 4/1992. p. 5,
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institutions (cf. comments on Foucault, supra,}, we should 
focus on transforming them into better institutions. This 
entails "View[ing] the present as the raw material of a
better future."102 *
We should thus stop talking about "alienation" as if we
understood the true nature of human life and could measure 
the difference between it and the corrupt and degraded 
existence of contemporary humanity.100
Foreshadowing the more sustained discussion in the next 
section, Rorty claims that we should emphasize the difference 
between real and cultural politics. For him, this is the 
difference between alleviating suffering and equalizing 
opportunities on the one hand, and redirecting the uses of 
learning and leisure on the other. We should thus be 
concrete, banal and pragmatic when we discuss politics, while 
being as abstract or "transgressive" as we wish when
discussing cultural politics.104 Most social hopes have very 
little to do with c ?al politics, and can stand on their 
own without questions about, for example, the nature of 
modernity. What is more in order are concrete fantasies
102 "Intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p. 6.
102 "Intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p. 6.
104 As we shall see in the following section, Rorty walks a fine line 
here: he rightly claims that critique heaped upon critique heaped upon
deconstruction will not stop the strong oppressing the weak, but might these 
not yield the changes in metaphor Rorty holds to be essential to all change.
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about a future where everyone can get work which gives 
satisfaction and a decent wage; a future in which everyone is 
safe from violence and humiliation.105
Since Plato, intellectuals have tried to support these 
small fantasies with a larger, blurfier, more sophisticated 
set of fantasies. From Plato until Hegel, such fantasies 
were linked to a story about humanity's relation to something 
larger and ahistorical; after Hegel turned discussion to a 
story about humanity's relation to Histoiy, History conceived 
as something with form and movement, belief in such 
explanations has let intellectuals feel that they can serve 
non-intellectuals by telling them how they can get what they 
want. These explanations let the intellectuals feel that 
their special gifts have social utility, they permit the 
intellectuals to function as an avant-garde. As we shall see
in the next section, this continues in the Cultural Politics
movement.106
With Hegel, World History became the name of an 
inspiring blur produced by conflating the immaterial and the 
material, the atemporal and the temporal. The Marxist- 
Leninist version helped us both to overcome our fear of 
elitism and to gratify our blood lust. It let us see
105 "intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p. 7.
106 "intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p-. 7.
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ourselves as about to be swept up by the aroused masses and 
"borne along toward the slaughter bench of history."10?
However, with Hegel, intellectuals began to switch from 
fantasies of contacting eternity to fantasies of constructing 
a better future. Hegel helped substitute hope for knowledge. 
Marx took this a step further, blurring the distinction 
between understanding the world and knowing how to change it. 
Marx sought to replace capitalism with communism and replace 
bourgeois culture with new forms of cultural life arising 
from the emancipation of the working class.107 08
Rorty feels that these Marxist suggestions should now be 
dropped. We can no longer use capitalism to mean both a 
market economy and the "source of all contemporary 
injustice." The same conceptual ambiguity plagues the terms 
"bourgeois ideology" and "working class". Some Marxist 
phrases are still, to Rorty's mind, quite resonant and can 
still motivate people to action, but they must be taken out 
of their grand theoretic context. They can exert, the 
greatest amount of suasion when put in the context of
concrete suggestions about how, for example, to reduce
structural unemployment.109
107 "Intellectuals at the End. of Socialism", p. 8.
108 "Intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p. 8.
!09 "intellectuals at the End of Socialism" , p. 9t 
61
What Rorty sees as still vital in Marxism is the same as
what he sees vital in Christianity:
...indignation over the fact that greed 
drives out sympathy... We are indignant... 
over the tendency of humanity to divide 
up into groups who want to hold on to 
what they have, rather than sharing the 
surplus... it is the same tendency Plato 
observed in his description of the 
plutocratic state and Jesus observed in 
the Jerusalem of his time, no
When Marxism was still an option, we dreamt of a time
when change would come from the bottom up, making it
unnecessary to rely on the sympathy of the strong. This is a
theme which recurs in the human rights discourse, Rorty's
analysis of which is discussed in chapter five below.
Western intellectuals are (regrettably to Rorty's mind) 
still looking for a successor to Marxism -- for a large 
theoretical framework to let us put society in a new context. 
The hope implicit in this search is that the new context will 
suggest something less banal to say than "people ought to be 
kinder, more generous, less selfish." Rorty feels that there 
may be nothing less banal to say, especially at the levels of 
generality theoiists enjoy.iiO 111
Cultural Politics, Deconstruction and Change
iiO "Intellectuals at the End of Socialism", p. 14.
Hl "Intellectuals at the End ot Socialism" , pp. 14-15.
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The Cultural Left, which Rorty defines following Henry 
Gates as a '"Rainbow Coalition of feminists, 
deconstructionists, Althusserians, Foucauldians, people 
working in ethnic or gay studies, etc.' "H2, seems for Rorty 
to share with Marxists and instinctive distrust of proposals 
for concrete, piecemeal reform and the conviction that it is 
very important to find the "correct theoretical analysis" of 
a social phenomenon, even if this analysis leads not to 
proposals for specific changes, but only to one more- 
reiteration of the need for change. ^3
Particularly singled out for Rorty's attention are those 
whose focus and "tools" are postmodern in orientation. The 
reasons for this are interesting. Rorty is damned by both 
left and right. Bv the right, Rorty is criticized for being 
irrationalist, relativist; they feel that he leaves American 
democracy without the philosophical foundations needed to 
support; we have already seen his response to these
accusations (cf Chapter II). From the left, however, Rorty 
has been accused of being neo-conservative. His Deweyan 
optimism is a large part of this, but also part is faith 
(also Deweyan) in reform. This critique seems generational 
in nature. Partly for this latter reason does Rorty seem so * *
112 Richard Rorty, "Two Cheers for the Cultural Left." The,... South 
Atlantic.Quarterly,. 89/1 1990. p. 288. No citation provided r u dihiu
213 "Two Cheers...", p. 2 32.
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touchy and defensive.
Most postmoderns (the English Department Left is another 
common descriptor) think that because bourgeois ideology (a 
term we have seen Rorty feels without which we would do
better) permeates all of our language and culture, there is 
no point in trying to offer straightforward arguments or 
proposals. We can, they claim, no longer try to generate 
change by spelling out the details of what the strong and 
rich are trying to do to the weak and poor. We have to be 
"indirect, sneaky and complex." To subvert the language of
our culture (which contains the roots of our culture's ills)
we need to get behind, beneath the language of bourgeois 
ideology. Although Rorty does not state it in the context of 
this debate, this is the putting to use of Derrida, et. al. 
for metaphysical purposes, a supreme irony. It is no longer 
enough when talking about oppression to expose what is 
happening materially; intellectuals must change the language 
in which such topics are discussed; if they do not, anything 
they say will be complicit with the dominant bourgeois 
ideology.114
This leads to the belief that the subject to study to 
change the world is Literature, and particularly Literary 
Criticism/Theory. It leads, further, to a generation of
114 Richard Rorty, "Intellectuals in Politics; Too Far In or Too Far 
Out?" PL- 'ent, Fall 1991. p. 487.
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young leftists who believe that "they are contributing to 
human freedom by campaigning against the prevalence of binary 
oppo s it i ons."115
What Rorty diagnoses as having happened without ever 
saying so, is that students of literature have gone down the 
path made by Plato and followed by so many others in their 
search for "metaphysical comfort." Despite the distrust of 
metanarratives implicit to postmodern thought, this
postmodernized ideologiekritik seeks to create just such an 
all encompassing theory.
One particular target of Rorty's attention is Andrew 
Ross. Ross views the English Department Left as "deepening 
and intensifying the Marxist critique of society." Consider 
the following:
A postmodern politics must complete the 
Gramscian move to extend the political 
into all spheres, domains and practices 
of our culture... Everything is
contestable; nothing is off limits; and 
no outcomes are guaranteed. These are 
the conditions of a "philosophy of 
praxis", which demands of its disciples 
that they put aside, the time being,
the rank-and-file state of mind -- in 
other words, their willing suspension of 
disbelief in a fixed ethical horizon.116
For Rorty, though, it is this rank-and-file state of mind
115 "Thugs and Theorists", p. 569.
116 "Intellectual in Politics...", pp. 487-488. No citation provided for 
Ross quote. See however, Andrew Ross, "On Intellectuals in Politics", 
Dissent, Spring 1992. pp. 263-265.
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that feels outrage when it sees the strong depriving the weak 
of hope. It was, furthermore, this sense of outrage which 
once drove the best and brightest of young people, the ones 
most disturbed by inequalities of life chances to read 
Rousseau, Voltaire and Paine. Later generations would read 
Marx, Lenin and Fanon; today they read Barthes, de Man and 
Ross. Rorty regards this as a loss, for once they read Ross, 
they have been diverted off the traditional Marxist track.117
Such theorists claim that what: the left needs is a
postmodern successor to Marxism -- a general theory of 
oppression that can bring race, class and gender together in 
a useful synthesis, burrow under the deepest infrastructures 
of our present language and unmask all ideological
aberrations at once. They tend to believe that the whole
tradition of liberal reform is so caught up on these
ideological aberrations as to be useless. For them, the only 
way to escape is by deconstructing the entirety of liberal
thought.118
Rorty rightly observes that this transgressive line of 
inquiry loses contact with the leftist tradition that often 
brought Social Democrats and Marxists together in common 
political Initiatives. It restricts itself to cultural
117 "Intellectual in Politics.,.", p. 433.
118 "Intellectual in Politics...", pp. 438-439,
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politics, while losing any relevance to tf* d r< mpt to use 
the institutions of a democratic society to help the weak 
resist the strong. They have given up on the idea of 
democratic politics, of mobilizing moral outrage in defense 
of the weak; they have no use for the vocabulary used by both 
bourgeois liberals (Dewey, Rorty) and Marxists to express 
their common hopes.119
The more they tell their students that the root cause 
of the suffering they see around them is "Western 
technological thinking" (Heidegger), "phallogocentrism" 
(Derrida), or "liberal individualism", rather than old
fashioned greed and selfishness, the more likely they are to 
believe that detecting these things in texts strikes a blow
for freedom. The more students are told that the most useful
thing they can do is unmask ideological aberration, the more 
likely they are to dismiss proposal for reformist legislation 
as mere distraction. The very unwillingness to think in 
terms of drafting and passing legislation demonstrates for 
Rorty the inutility of this new left.120
The upshot of all of this for Rorty is that, it has 
yielded
119 "Intellectual in Politics.,.", p. 4 8 9-.
120 "Intellectual in Politics.,.", p. 490,- Richard Rorty, "'Richard Rorty
Replies", ___ yt, Spring P' • . ; . 265-
6
...the idiot jargon... Leftspeak -- a 
dreadful, pompous mishmash of Marx,
Adorno, Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan. It 
has resulted in articles that offer 
unmaskings of the presuppositions of 
earlier unmaskings of the presuppositions 
of earlier unmaskings. It has created 
the contemporary equivalent of the self- 
involved Trotskyite discussion groups of 
the 1930s.121
Ross thinks that Rorty's observations are obvious; Rorty 
cites the example of Ross claiming that no one has any 
difficulty recognizing that the rich are "soaking" the poor. 
Rorty claims that many, in fact, do not recognize this; as 
evidence he cites the phenomenon of Reagan Democrats, the 
industrial and rural poor, traditionally Democrat 
"successfully duped" into voting Republican.
Rorty regards the dismissal by Ross of statistics and 
journalism as the lowest form of political consciousness as 
simply a way of claiming that what they (Literature and 
Philosophy) do is more important than what sociologists and 
journalists do.
They are right that we must go beyond the press to 
popular culture to find the issues important to people, but 
to this Rorty responds with a quintesse’k i il pragmatist
-;ry: What do you do with this information? How do you use
it to change institutions and laws?
If they believe that raised consciousness will trickle
121 "Thugs and Theorists", p. 570.
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down as it did with feminism, for example, sophisticated 
theoretical analyses and deconstructions will do nothing but 
put it further out of reach.
Students should not be taught that "phallogocentrism" or 
"humanism" must go before things can get better. For Rorty, 
this implies that topics only philosophically sophisticated 
individuals can grasp are more politically urgent than what 
the average voter can grasp. Rorty is correct to dismiss 
this as elitist and antithetical to the whole idea of
universal adult franchise.122
At the root of Rorty's objections is his denial that 
continental thinkers have given us new tools to analyze the 
system. As was discussed in Chapter III, their philosophies 
are inherently private. For Rorty, Foucault was a useful 
historian of particular institutions, but his neo-
Nietzcheanism seems to have no particular relevance to 
ideologiekritik, social Reform or politics as the English 
Department Left would have it. Neither Derrida nor Foucault 
taught or practiced a method that does better what the old 
Marxists tried to do -- expose the "underlying meaning" Of 
what our culture. They are important and useful philosophers 
for Rorty because they help envisage a social democratic 
utopia in which "Enlightenment Liberalism is carried through 
to its limit, eradicating in the process the last traces of
122 "Richard Rorty Replies", pp. 266-267..
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Enlightenment tat ionalism. "L23
Rorty supports my claim of the irony inherent in the
Cultural Politics program (pp30-31, supra) in his claim that
neither Derrida nor Foucault can be blended with Marx
(although he finds them comfortably blendable with Dewey and 
Rawls). As Rorty explains it, "Marx is a perfect example of 
"the metaphysics of presence" that deconstructors want to
deconstruct -- the set of ideas that centers on the
distinctions between reality and appearance."123 24
123 "Thugs and Theorists", p. 571.
124 "Thugs and Theorists",
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Solidarity
Traditionally, philosophers have tried to bolster human 
solidarity by attempting to determine what is essential to 
humans which separates them from the beasts. Philosophers of 
contingency who are also interested in the expansion of human 
solidarity such as Rorty, do not have such an option. For 
them what it means to be a good or just or inhuman is 
relative to contingent local spatiotemporal conditions.
Rorty believes that we should cease to desire such universal
criteria.
For Rorty, a belief, no matter how contingently held 
"can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying 
for..."125 This is a highly counter-intuitive claim, which I am 
not sure I am ready to accept except in the cases of all but 
the most extraordinary persons; who could really say that 
they would surrender up their life for something which they 
understand they may not believe tomorrow?
Rorty borrows Wilfrid Sellars' concept of "we 
intentions" as the basis for moral judgment. For Rorty and 
Sellars, immorality is defined as something 'which "we" do not 
do. This defines the in-group in opposition to all. others
who do indeed commit such acts. Someone within "us" who
commits such an act is, by virtue of this commission, no 
longer one of "us". The most important (philosophical)
Solidar: 189 .
questions thus become "Who are 'we', how did we come to be
what we are, and what might we become?"126
Rorty rightly points out that this "we" is of greater 
emotional appeal when it is local and particular; we thought 
of as humanity is still too abstract to motivate most
persons.
This may seem somewhat pessi , but Rorty does see
both a history of progress and hope for future progress in 
terms of expansion of whom we consider part of "us". This 
point will become central to the discussion in the following 
section, but for now let it suffice to say that solidarity 
should not be thought of in terms of recognition of a core 
nature which we all share; it is plain that Rorty has no use 
for such an idea. We should, in our efforts to promote 
solidarity, try to view traditions among people and peoples 
as less significant than the only thing which truly is shared 
by all, the capacity for humiliation. Solidarity -- as was 
the case with individual identity -- is made rather than
found.127
We can and should treat solidarity as a goal, and 
articulate it for public purposes as if it had the 
metaphysical basis which Rorty refutes, a 11 focus
126 "Contingency of Community", pp. 59-60,
127 "Solidarity", p. 192-195.
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imaginarius" . We should realize that, a focus imaginarius is 
none the worse fox' being a construct; it is a part of our 
final vocabu1ary.12 8
Rorty on Human Rights
According to Rorty, throughout history, people have used 
the terms "man" or "human" to mean "people like us." The 
line between humans and animals is not, for many, simply the 
line between "featherless bipeds" and all others; there are 
animals walking around in humanoid form. Such was the 
attitude taken by the Germans with regard to the Jews, the 
Serbs with regard to the Muslims. "We" (such a "we" as 
identified in the previous sentence) and those like us are 
paradigm cases of humanity, but those too different from us 
in behavior or custom are, at best, borderline cases.* 129
The human-animal distinction is only one of three ways 
by which we paradigmatic humans tell ourselves from the 
borderline cases. The second is the distinction between
adults and children. We tend to treat ignorant,
superstitious people like children. They are held to be able 
to attain true humanity only if given a proper (our) 
education. If they cannot absorb the education, they are
1-28 "Solidarity" , p. 196.
129 Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality" in Brown and 
Shute, On Hunan,.Rights. 1994. p. 113.
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obviously not human.130
This has been said in the past of women, but the 
simpler, more pervasive way to exclude women is to equate 
"man" with "humanity". This reinforces the average male's 
thankfulness for not having been born female, and reinforces 
his fear of the ultimate degradation, feminization. 
Feminization may take the form variously of emasculation or 
penetration.131
Because for most males, being a woman does not count as 
a way of being human; the third way of not being human is not 
being male.
Throughout history, philosophers have tried to expand 
the breadth of those we number among the human by explaining 
what only we as humans have -- what is essential to being 
human. For Plato it was a special added ingredient which all 
other animals lack. Respect for this is why people should be 
nice to each other. Nietzsche replied that efforts to get 
people to be nice are doomed to fail because the real truth 
about human nature is that we are a "uniquely nasty and
dangerous kind of animal. "132
When neo-Platonists claim that all featherless bipeds
130 "Human Rights, Rationality
1-31 "Human Rights, Rationality
and Sentimentality"
arid Sentirnenta 1 ity"
pp. 113-114.
p. 114.
332 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", pp. 114-115.
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have the same inalienable rights, Nietzscheans dismiss the 
whole idea of an inalienable right as an attempt by the weak 
to resist the strong by means of metaphysical claims and 
guilt.
In getting beyond this Plato-Nietzsche debate, we have 
become less prone to ask the question "What is our Nature?" 
and more willing to ask "What can we make of ourselves?".
This implies that we generally take theories and philosophies 
of human nature less seriously than in the past. We have 
come to think of ourselves as the "flexible, self-
creatlng/self-shaping animal", rather than the rational 
animal (Plato/Kant) or the cruel animal (Nietzsche) . i3a This
does not, however, preclude one from being cruel,
particularly as Rorty would remind us, in one's Nietzschean 
quest for self-creation.
It is one of the shapes Rorty believes we have assumed 
which is the focus of his article, the Human Rights Culture, 
a term he takes from Eduardo Rabossi, an Argentine jurist and 
philosopher of law. For Rorty, this culture should just be 
welcomed as a fact; we should not attempt (philosophically) 
to get behind or beneath this fact. There is no need to 
identify and defend its philosophical presuppositions. It is 
Rorty's belief that the human rights culture renders human 
rights foundationalis . , etual.) outmoded and
133 «HUman Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. lib.
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irrelevant. 3-34
In this conception, the question of whether or not we 
really have the rights listed in the Helsinki Declaration is 
not even worth raising. There is nothing relevant to moral 
choice separating human beings from animals except
historically contingent facts of the world, cultural facts. 
Some critics label this cultural relativism, because it seems 
incompatible with the fact that our human rights culture is 
morally superior to other cultures. It is Rorty's
contention, however, that this superiority is not in any way 
presupposed by the existence of universal human rights. For 
Rorty, the criticism is only valid if we believe that a moral 
claim is invalid if it is not backed up by knowledge of the
element which makes humans distinct. For Rorty, however, "It 
is not clear why respect for human dignity must presuppose 
the existence of any such attribute".134 35
We have traditionally called the essential element 
Rationality. Critics associate cultural relativism with 
irrationality because it denies the existence of morally 
relevant facts which are applicable regardless of the
cultural, context.
The task as Rorty sees it is to make the human rights
134 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 115-116
135 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 116.
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culture more self-conscious and more powerful, not to
demonstrate its superiority by an appeal to something
transcultural. All philosophy can do is summarize our 
culturally influenced intuitions about the right thing to do 
in various situations,- these generalizations are not supposed 
to ground our intuitions, just summarize. The formulation of 
such summarizing generalizations increases the predictability 
and thus the power and efficiency of our institutions, 
heightening our sense of shared moral identity which brings 
us together in a moral community.136
It is Rorty's claim that the emergence and spread of the 
human rights culture owes nothing to increased moral 
knowledge, rather it is the result of hearing "sad and 
sentimental stories." Since nothing useful seems to arise 
from insisting on a "purportedly ahistorical" human nature, 
there probably is not one. If there is, it is probably 
irrelevant to our moral choices. It is important to note 
that Rorty's doubts about the effectiveness of appeals to 
moral knowledge are doubts about causal links and causal 
efficacy, not about epistemic status. To question their 
epistemic status would be to restart the debate Rorty finds 
so pointless.137
136 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 117.,
13• "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", pp. 118-119. 
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Before investigating how Rortv came to hold this 
position, we must, look at an ironic oversight of his: despite 
his Deweyan focus on practice and activism to he found 
elsewhere, in this discussion Rorty relies almost entirely 
upon the power of redescription, Rorty inexcusably ignores 
the role of human-rights activists for whom the motivations 
would almost certainly be found to be based upon metaphysical 
absolutes, the same Platonic/Kantian/Christian beliefs Rorty 
claims have done little to help the cause. In the broad 
sense, I believe Rorty's claims to be correct, without 
imaginative redescription to help us identify with suffering 
others, human rights activists would be nothing more than 
gadflies; the publications of Amnesty International and its 
sister organizations, where suffering is plainly spelled out, 
must be recognized (by Rorty most of all) as playing a role 
complemetary to the novel. I believe Rorty would readily 
accede to this point.
For Rorty, moral philosophy has become largely 
irrelevant to our lives. The story begins between Kant and 
the present, when Darwin convinced most Vh stern intellectuals 
that there was no special added ingredient making humans 
unique. For Darwin, we are simply exceptionally talented 
animat' .hover enough to fake charge of our own evolution 
(change our environment). This fit nicely with the dominant 
historicist trend in philosophy of the time, which had arisen
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as a response to Kantian transcendentalism. These
his: ocimists look to the future, not to eternity. For them, 
ideas about how change can come about are more interesting 
than discussion about the criteria, for determining the 
desirability of change. 138
The same period saw a great increase in wealth, literacy 
and leisure which made possible an unprecedented acceleration 
in the rate of moral progress fas defined by Rorty -- 
enlarging the group defined as "us"). It is enough, suggests 
Rorty, to know that we live in an age in which we can make 
things better for ourselves; we do not need to dig behind the
historical facts for non-historical (the existence of which 
Rorty, of course, dismisses) ones about what we really are,, 
The more we see a chance to recreate (redescribe) ourselves,
the less likely we are to read Darwin as offering another 
theory about what we really are, and the more likely we are 
to take him as providing reasons about why we need not even 
ask what we really are. 139
We should cease asking questions about, what human nature 
truly is and focus on more tangible, pragmatic issues like 
"What sort of world can we prepare for our great­
grandchildren?" If we must establish a difference between
138 -Human Rights
139 "Human Rights
Rationality
Rationality
and Sen t iment all ty",
and. Sent iment a 1 i ty " , 
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ourselves and the animals, it is not that we can know and 
they can only feel; it is more properly (especially for the 
aims of promoting a human rights culture) that we can feel 
for each other to a much greater extent.1^
Rorty's final argument for the replacement of 
foundationalism is purely pragmatic: it would be more 
efficient. By doing so, it would let us concentrate on 
manipulating the sentiments. Rorty is speaking here of what 
he calls "sentimental education", which as we shall see, and 
as was alluded to earlier, is the linchpin of his proposals.
A sentimental education is one that sufficiently acquaints 
people of different kinds with one another, so that they are 
less likely to think of those different from themselves as 
less than human. This is the expansion of "we consciousness" 
mentioned previously.141
Plato thought the way to get people to be nicer was to 
point out what they all had in common, but this has been 
historically of little avail. Kant was scarcely more 
successful; pinning his hopes on saying that one should not 
treat rational agents as means hinges on who counts as a 
rational agent. Traditionally, rational agency was 
synonymous with membership in one's own moral community. 140
140 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 122.
141 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", pp.. 122-123 .
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People with fundament .ally different moral beliefs could of 
course only hold such misguided beliefs because they are 
irrational, and hence, only quasi-human.
Kant's Categorical Imperative tells one that she should 
extend the respect she feels for people like herself to all 
"featherless bipeds." Outside of post-Enlightenment European 
culture, most people have no conception of why membership in 
homo sapiens is supposed to suffice for membership in a moral 
community. This is not because they are insufficiently 
rational; it is because they "live in a world in which it 
would be just too risky to let their sense of moral community
stretch far."142
It is of no avail to tell them to look at all that they 
have in common and see that it is more important than the
trivial differences, because they will see nothing of the 
sort. They will in all likelihood be offended by the very 
suggestion that they treat people whom they do not think of 
as human as if they were. Their rejection is neither
rhetorical nor irrational, but is rather heartfelt and 
sensibly pragmatic. The identities of these people are tied 
to a sense of who they are not. They do not think of 
themselves as human per se, but rather a particular, good 
kind which is defined in opposition to a particular bad kind. 
Insofar as they are impoverished and their lives are
142 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 125.
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perpetually at risk, they have little except pride in not 
being this other to sustain their self-respect.143 144
Such persons should not be treated as irrational, but 
rather deprived; not deprived of (moral) knowledge as 
foundstionalists would have it, but rather deprived of 
security and sympathy. For Rorty, security is simply the 
having life's conditions sufficiently risk-free to make one's 
differences from others inessential to one's self-respect. 
Sympathy is best described by example: reactions white 
Americans had after reading Unc1e Tom's Cabin; the 
bourgeoisie had after reading Bleak House and Oliver Twist; 
what we today feel seeing news reports from Bosnia and 
Rwanda. It would seem guilt is a large, but implicit
factor. 144
For Rorty, security and sympathy go together. The more 
dangerous one's situation, the less one can afford the time 
to think what it might be like for people with whom one does 
not immediately identify. A sentimental education can only 
work if people can relax long enough to listen.
The spread of the human rights culture is not a. matter 
of becoming more aware of the requirements of moral law, but 
rather a "progress of sentiments." It consists in an
143 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 125.
144 “Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p.
83
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increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves 
and people very unlike ourselves outweighing the dtsnences. 
The relevant similarities are not a matter of sharing a "deep 
true self which instantiates true humanity, but such little 
simi as cherishing our parents and children."145
An obvious objection to the reliance upon sentiment
intrinsic to the recommendations Rorty has presented is that
reliance upon it rather than the command of reason, natural
law or divine will is to rely upon powerful people gradually
ceasing to oppress others out of mere (newfound) niceness or
guilt. It is quite revolting to think that our only hope for
a decent society consists in softening the hearts of the
leisure class. Allow me to quote Rorty at length on this:
We want moral progress to burst up from 
below, rather than waiting patiently upon 
condescension from the top. The residual 
popularity of Kantian ideas of
"unconditional moral obligation" -- 
obligation imposed by deep ahistorical 
noncontingent forces-- seems to me almost 
entirely due to our abhorrence for the 
idea that the people on top the
future in their hands... that there is 
nothing more powerful to which we can 
appeal against them... prefer a bottom-up 
way of achieving utopia...which will make 
the last first. But I do no think this 
is how utopia will in fact come into 
being... why does this preference make us 
resist the thought that sentimentality 
may be the best weapon we have? We 
resist out of resentment; We resent the 
idea that we shall have to wait for the 
strong to turn their piggy little eyes to
145 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p. 129.
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the suffering of the weak. We 
desperately hope that there is something 
stronger and more powerful that will hurt 
the strong if they do not... The desperate 
hope for a noncontingent and powerful 
ally is, according to Nietzsche, the 
common core of Platonism, of religious 
insistence on divine omnipotence, and of 
Kantian moral philosophy. 146
In conclusion, the best answer to the question "Why 
should I care about a stranger, a person who is not kin, 
whose habits I find disgusting?" is a "long, sad, sentimental 
story" which begins "Because this is what it is like to be in 
her situation..." or "Because he may become your son-in-law..." 
or "Because their mothers would grieve for them..." It is 
Rorty's contention that such stories repeated and varied over 
the centuries have gotten us to tolerate and even cherish 
people whose appearance, habits or beliefs seemed initially 
an insult to our own moral identity.147
Can Rorty's nominalist anti-foundationalism offer 
anything to the cause? Williams offers a sympathetic
account.
The image of tortured innocents has 
played a central role in the intellectual 
history oi nonfoundationalist thought...
[For nonfoundationalistsl The torture of 
innocents is wrong because it violates 
our culture's celebration of the
individual and our se ntial
146 "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentirnehtality", pp, 130-I31, 
Emphasis in original.
14” "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", p, 133.
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dignity and equality of human beings 
[Rorty would studiously avoid the term 
"essential]... A Wittgensteinian strategy 
provides the most direct response. The 
torture of innocents is wrong because of 
the grammar of the sentence. If someone 
is "innocent," then by definition she 
should not be punished: by calling her 
innocent the speaker presupposes that 
conclusion. And "torture"? Let us begin 
by noting that, within our contemporary 
language of morality, torture provides 
the touchstone of moral bankruptcy.
Whatever Evil Ones did to their 
Innocents, if Amnesty Intern al can
successfully label it as torture, it has 
won the battle for moral condemnation. A 
successful charge that someone has 
tortured innocents ends the discussion:
Torture's status as a trump card signals 
its central ideological role as the 
reference point of immorality.148
This is precisely the task and self-image of the 
pragmatist philosopher; she works in a role ancillary to the 
activist. She lends support to the activist when the 
activist is challenged on philosophical grounds. Presumably 
the pleasure is particularly sweet, when taking a page from 
Wittgenstein as Williams does, the pragmatist gets to 
demonstrate that the challenge is, in fact not a problem at
all.
"Rorty, Radicalism, Romantic i so..." , pp. 157-158.
86
148
Chapter VI
Conclusions
87
In exploring Richard Rorty's thought we have uncovered a 
tension between his emphases on negative liberty and radical 
egalitarianism, and the tension between private irony and 
public solidarity.
There is another apparent inconsistency; in his advocacy 
of the public role of the novel, it would seem that Rorty 
repeats the mistake he identifies in Nabokov of splitting 
novels into the Important and the unimportant. I think this 
is a non-issue. I will address this aestheticism question 
before offering a concluding analysis of the liberty-equality 
problem.
Rorty's Aestheticism
Because Rorty's choices of moral exemplar novels comes 
from the canon of the cultural elite, he has been accused of
aestheticism and snobbery; I believe that, they were chosen, 
to the contrary, because of their familiarity, both to Rorty 
and to his projectd readership. It was not an aesthetic
decision.
Rorty's criteria for literary merit are certainly 
different than those of Nabokov, for example. For Nabokov, 
it is sublimity that marks a novel's merit.. Rorty sees the 
criterion as awakening readers to the various forms of 
humiliation which people are forced to endure, and the means 
by which it is inflicted.
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The first sort of novel (identifying suffering) is what 
Nabokov labeled "topical trash". In such works -- Rorty 
particularly singles out Dickens' and Orwell's writings -- we 
are taken into the very details of the suffering inflicted 
upon people. In this genre (if that is an apt term), the 
suffering is conveyed particularly effectively because it is 
told from the perspective of the sufferer. "Fiction like 
that of Dickens, Olive Schreiner, or Richard Wright gives us 
the details about the kinds of suffering being endured by 
people to whom we had previously not attended."149
It is Rorty's very strong belief (this has come up 
repeatedly) that seeing the suffering of others will make 
them less an other to us, because we are shown that the only 
thing all persons share (inasmuch as this is not a claim 
about essences), suffering, is being endured by these 
previously non-persons. If they can feel what we feel, they 
are more worthy of consideration.
The second type of novel is the sort which is told from 
the perspective of the inflicter of the suffering. In many 
instances, particularly those important to Rorty, the 
suffering is not inflicted intentionstw i .t is rather the 
effect of an individual's pursuit of private perfection or
autonomy upon those around him -- Nietzsche's life is a fine 
example. "Fiction like that of Choderlos de Laclos, Henry
149 "introduction" Cont i agency.... p. XVI.
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James, or Nabokov gives us the details about what sorts of
ciuca’y we ourselves are capable of, and thereby hero us
redescribe ourselves,"^o
For Rorty, by seeing ourselves as inflicters of pain, as 
humilinters, we will hopefully alter our self-image and our 
behavior toward others. With luck and perserverance, perhaps 
this will spread, making our community as a whole less likely
to inflict humiliation.
Critics claim that Rorty sets a hurdle of aesthetic 
merit below which a novel can offer few lessons. Rorty does 
not prioritize among genres, he uses "novel" as a generic 
term, and, in fact, allows that, such various media as 
television, newspapers, film, rap, punk, even comic books can
convey important, messages. Regrettably, he does not do this 
in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, beyond which few
readers (or critics) venture; in it, he focuses almost 
exclusively on novels. Having been raised among the high 
culture, he undoubtedly has private pi - v imces, but any work 
which expands our sensitivity to the suffering of others 
counts for Rorty as important.
There are works which in no way expand our sensitivity 
to the suffering of others, and Rorty would plainly see no 
public role for such works; he would not, however, dismiss 
them, for they may provide some certain nameless thing which
150 "Introduction" Cont ir. r -__ , p. xvi. 
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is central to the ongoing process of rediscription of some 
individual,
Rorty may have been raised to appreciate high culture, 
and he may have private preferences which reflect that, but I 
see no reflection of this in his politics. Where he appears 
dismissive is in his dispute with the cultural politics 
thinkers. They valorize popular forms of literature, music 
and art over those appreciated by people sharing Rorty's 
background and taste; Rorty does not accept this
valorization, but neither does he invert it. Rorty simply 
demands that they go beyond kritik to action.
Mill, Marx, and Rorty
Can Rorty's love of liberty be reconciled with his
desire for radical economic egalitarianism? This matter was 
further muddied in the last chapter when Rorty distanced
himself from the critical-theoretical orientation and
revolutionism of Marxism in favor of a more Deweyan approach. 
He even rejects much Marxist vocabulary, doing so, however, 
because it is no longer useful -- a quintessentially 
Pragmatist consideration.
We are told in "Trotsky and the Wild Orchids" that Rorty 
was raised a Marxist, and brought up to believe that only the 
overthrow of capitalism wcill equalize opportunities for
all. In the same piece, however, we are told that not only
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was Dewey one his parent's greatest heroes, but that Sidney 
Hook, one of Dewey's closest disciples, was one of their 
closest friends -- he later became one of Rorty's, Their 
influence on him was as great as Trotsky's.
Neither Dewey nor Hook were Marxists, neither were 
revolutionaries (the claim has been made of Hook, who later 
became a supporter of both the Cold War and Reaganisi), and 
their bona fides as Trotskyites are suspect, although Dewey 
did head the commission of inquiry into the trial and 
assassination of Trotsky. It would seem that the seeds of 
Rorty's apparent schizophrenia were planted early. This 
leads to the question of whether Dewey shared this
inconsistency, because it is his Social Democracy which Rorty
now embraces.
I do not believe that liberty and economic equality 
are, a priori, antithetical; Rorty does get into trouble when 
he states that each is the highest public aspiration. They 
can not logically both be primary; this is a problem which is 
further complicated when he claims that not being cruel to 
others is the highest expectation to which we can be held. I 
believe that this is nothing more than carelessness on 
Rorty's part; the various essays in which these claims were 
made were written several years apart, and for different
audiences.
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It may perhaps be useful to attempt to synt s1 s " e 
positions, staking out the position I believe Rorty would 
take if confronted with this inconsistency.
Basic material (economic) security and basic physical 
security are the absolute bedrock needs for any person or 
community Rorty would probably dislike the foundation 
metaphor, but it is properly evocative. In Western political 
theory, physical security is usually assumed to require some 
sort of empowered authority (there is no need to investigate 
the lengthy debates about the meaning, nature, and sources of 
these two- terms for these purposes). Hobbes' Leviathan is 
the archetype; later theorists realized that we no longer 
needed an authority quite so intrusive, and sought to 
articulate a system where the rulership's power had been 
pared down to the least necessary levels: the provision of 
security.
Concomitant with the narrowing of government authority 
is the demand for democracy, this happens, however, only once 
people are secure enough in their day-today lives to care.
Not only do people want the government as much out of their 
lives as possible, but they want it to be of, by, for and 
accountable to the people. As we have seen in the evolution 
of democracy in the West, who counts as mattering evolved 
only very slowly, but we now enshrine the ideal of universal 
adult franchise. Rorty would remind us that, none of this
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happened of necessity, each step was wholly contingent; 
things could have gone otherwise.
The concept of provision of security, for contingent 
reasons, evolved in the West to mean only the provision of 
physical security, protection from violence. Economic 
security was not considered a right by many thinkers until 
the nineteenth century. Although not the lust "o articulate 
it, we associate this idea most often with Marx. Marx
provided the West with a vision of a future where all would 
be materially secure and equal.
For Marx, the realization of this vision required the 
usurpation of the existing order. Although a subject of 
debate, Marx's vision is often interpreted as anti­
democratic; he did promise democracy at the end of the 
socialist road, but it was to be totally unlike the 
bourgeoisie parliamentary democracies the world had yet
known.
Rorty is unwilling to sacrifice one freedom for another. 
Social Democrats, among whom Rorty would count himself, both 
of Marx's day, and our own, have held that democracy and 
economic equality are not mutually exclusive. They do not 
advocate the (violent) overthrow of the existing order, but a 
gradualistic reform of its economic inequalities.
Ultimately, socialism is realizable, but not, for Rorty, at 
the cost of violence or repression. What is important to
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note about social democrats is that they most often work 
within a democratic framework. Or, more precisely, they have 
been most successful working within democracies. One might 
infer from this that democracy is a precondition for economic 
equality; certainly Marxists would reject this; they would 
presumably invert this conclusion.
I believe that Rorty would concur with my inference. It 
is a necessary but insufficient condition, however. First 
the wealthy, the powerful, must be made aware of the 
suffering of those less materially well of than they; here 
again we see the role of the imaginative identifier, the 
novelist, the investigative journalist.
The Marxist inversion of my social-democratic scenario 
has one inescapable seed of truth: even after physical 
security was secured, it was only after the bourgeoisie were 
economically secure that they began to make demands for 
democracy. It is plausible to claim that some level of 
basic economic security is essential for democracy.
I believe that social democrats come down sensibly 
between laissez-faire capitalists who claim that if we take
care of freedom (s,e. , leave the market alone), economic well 
being will take care of itself; any claim about equality 
beyond the claim that all have the chance to become wealthy 
at the expense of others is in manifest bad faith, and 
Marc ' who claim that if we level the circumstances of all,
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democracy will take care of itself. 1 believe that in this 
regard, I am in accord with Rorty and Dewey.
I would like to close by looking again at two passages
from Rorty's credo and considering whether there is, indeed a
tension between liberty and equality.
Given the failures of central 
governmental planning, we can no longer 
make "nationalization of the means of 
production" a central element in our 
definition of "socialism"... we have to use 
some such definition of "socialism" as...
"overcoming the greed and selfishness 
which are still built into the
motivational patterns impressed on our 
children, and into the institutions 
within which they will have to live." We 
have to find a definition that commits us 
to both greater equality and a change in 
moral climate without committing us to 
any particular economic setup. Nobody so 
far has invented an economic setup that 
satisfactorily balances decency and 
efficiency... There is nothing sacred about 
either the free market or about central 
planning; the proper balance between the 
two is a matter of experimental 
tinkering.152
Is there anything which a priori infringes on the 
individual's right to be left alone in this passage? Rorty 
has rejected nationalization. He will not fake from the 
individual; he rejects this not on principled grounds, but on 
grounds of efficacy -- central planning and collectivization 
were failures. On grounds of cruelty, the Soviet experience 
certainly argues against collectivization.
152 "Thugs and Theorists", pp. 565-567.
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He wants to attack inequality through guilt, not through 
restructuring the economy. Rorty is not a fan of caihhil. m, 
but the coincidence of capitalism and democracy cannot allow 
him to call for its disco 1 ltd on without a concrete
alternative; in this case, given the magnitude of the
undertaking, 1 believe he would want the alternative to have 
already succeeded in practice; "Try it, you might like it" 
would not be sufficient when democracy and freedom are at 
stake.
Rorty advocates socializing our children in such a way 
that not only democracy is held as a good, as part of our 
community's self-image, but so is equality. We must educate 
our children to fight inequality; when they get older, we 
must show them that they are surrounded by greed, and that
this is to be abhorred, but for now, we must work to not
teach them greed.
We have... universities in which teachers 
continually urge students to combat... 'the 
forces and tendencies at work (e.g., 
class conflict, social division,
patriarchy, racism) which are compatible 
with liberal political practices but 
nevertheless foster real inequality and 
limit effective political freedom.153
In this passage, our children are now in universities. 
They are being taught that our liberal society, the same we 
previously taught them was the most free yet created, has
153 "Thugs, and Theorists", pp. 565-567.
97
long been tolerant of many inequalities which were long left 
in place because they do not interfere with our liberal 
institutions. They are hopefully going to combine all of the 
committments inculcated in them through the years and strive 
to overcome all of the inequlaities remaining in our 
community. They will do this not because is rhiectively 
correct, the will of God, the law of nature or the inherent 
role of man, but simply because the culture in which they 
were raised believes that freedom, is good and inequality is 
bad, and this they were taught to believe and act upon.
9 8
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